

SECURITY INFORMATION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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19 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL PARTRIDGE:

The following are answers to questions originating in the Intelligence Advisory Committee in regard to establishment of a blockade of Communist China. They were prepared by working teams of the Joint Strategic Plans Group and bear no official approval. It is noted that the subject is currently under study by the Joint Staff.

1. Q - What U.S. Forces could be made available for the implementation of a sea blockade against Communist China?

A - Sufficient U.S. Naval Forces can be made available from the Pacific Fleet with which to establish an effective blockade of the Coast of China.

2. Q - What percentage of Communist China's seaborne imports could this force interdict?

A - Seventy-five to ninety per cent of Communist China's seaborne imports could be interdicted.

3. Q - What would be the effect of the implementation of a sea blockade on U.S. capabilities elsewhere?

A - Blockading forces would be furnished from the Pacific Fleet without material reduction of the forces supporting in Korea. The blockade could be withdrawn at any time, or its effectiveness reduced, if necessary, to fulfill more important commitments.

4. Q - How would U.S. capabilities to implement the blockade be effected if the Communists were to carry out air and submarine attacks on the blockading ships?

A - The blockade can be established in areas far enough removed to minimize the effect of Communist air attack. The effect of submarine attacks on blockading vessels is questionable, since these ships would be primarily anti-submarine types.

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5. Q - Would the U.S. forcefully prevent vessels from running the blockade?

A - Yes. The control of traffic is implicit in the establishment of an effective blockade. See 6 below.

6. Q - If Port Arthur and Dairen were blockaded, would the U.S. be prepared to interdict Soviet vessels that attempted to run the blockade?

A - The U.S. would be within its rights under international law, and should interdict Soviet merchant vessels attempting to run the blockade. Any concessions to the Russians, which would of course reduce the effectiveness of the blockade, would be adopted for political rather than military reasons. The U.S. would probably not interdict Russian ships if sailed under Russian naval convoy.

7. Q - If Navy interdiction of Soviet vessels led to attacks, particularly air attacks, against the blockading ships from Soviet forces, would the U.S. still be competent to implement the blockade?

A - The effectiveness of air attack would be minimized by operating in remote areas. An effective blockade could be maintained.

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